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Fred K. Drogula,
Commanders and Command in the Roman Republic and Early Empire.
Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2015. Pp. 432. Cloth
(ISBN 978-1-4696-2126-5) $59.95.
Students of Roman history are well aware that “commanders and command” had 
a significant bearing on much of the politics of the res publica, through such key 
concepts as imperium, auspicium, potestas, and provincia as well as the duties of im-
perium-wielding magistrates—consuls, praetors, and dictators. This book, therefore, 
cuts to the heart of how Romans conceived of their res publica working and how they 
ultimately administered the empire they acquired. 
Drogula commences his discussion of military command (chapter 1) by point-
ing out that tradition held that civilian and military duties were combined in one 
senior magistracy—the consulship—from the time that the Republic was founded 
(in 509 BCE). However, Romans knew that praetors were the first commanders (a 
praetor maximus is attested in the sources, for instance, and the general’s tent was 
always called the praetorium). Drogula posits here and develops later (chapter 4) the 
argument that the consulship was not established until 367 BCE, at which time the 
praetorship became the subordinate magistracy. In the early Republic, he adds, wars 
seem to have been fought by warlords with private armies, not by armies funded by 
the state, which indicates rather a separation of civilian and military duties.
The ramifications of this separation of civilian and military duties become clear-
er in Drogula’s discussion of the spheres of magisterial power and authority, domi et 
militiae (chapter 2), in which he is careful to distinguish the difference between the 
power that civilian authorities exercised within the pomerium (potestas), conferred 
by election in the centuriate assembly, from the power that military commanders 
exercised outside it (imperium), conferred by a Lex Curiata. Drogula also is at pains 
to show that magistrates could not exercise their imperium within the pomerium, as 
many ancient sources and modern scholars (beginning with Mommsen) have long 
contended (85–87). The magistrate assumed his imperium only after taking the aus-
pices and exiting the city.
One exception to this rule prohibiting the exercise of imperium within the 
pomerium was the triumph, when a commander clearly had to possess imperium 
within the pomerium so that he could lead his troops in the ceremony and wear the 
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military insignia of the triumphing general. However, this exception to the rule was 
carefully regulated, and the privilege of a triumph was conferred only after a decree 
of the senate and law passed by the popular assemblies (111–13).
A second exception was the dictatorship. The distinguishing characteristic of a 
dictator was not was greater or supreme power (imperium maius or summum) vis-à-
vis other senior magistrates, Drogula argues, but rather his ability to exercise his im-
perium within the pomerium, which also explains why dictators were often appointed 
to quell domestic unrest (118–21). Many early dictators were men of great distinction, 
and they largely ruled alone (with the assistance of their Master of Horse), which 
may have been why later authors assumed that dictators in general had greater pow-
er than consuls.
Drogula’s discussion of the dictatorship touches on a recurring theme of this 
book, namely, that there was no such thing as imperium maius before the end of the 
Republic; rather all magistrates with imperium had equal imperium, but what distin-
guished the consulship, say, from the praetorship, was prestige—such as, the number 
of lictors and the fasces as well as the opportunity to win military renown (greater for 
the consul than the praetor). This hierarchy of the Roman military command struc-
ture evolved over time and was greatly enhanced by the development of the idea of 
provinciae as geographical areas (chapter 3). As is well known, the term provincia 
originally denoted a task to be completed, but as the empire expanded additional 
commanders were needed to administer it. The principle of prorogation, which was 
the extension of a provincia, not imperium (as Drogula argues), also contributed to 
the creation of permanent provinciae (chapter 4). Praetors, moreover, were usually 
assigned to provinciae which had become geographical regions with defensive gar-
risons (e.g., Sicily) and thus enjoyed fewer opportunities for military glory. Consuls, 
on the other hand, were still assigned provinciae as military tasks to be completed 
(chapter 5).
The analysis to this point in the book lays the groundwork for the chapter on 
the late Republic (chapter 6), which shows how the concepts of imperium and pro-
vincia came to be manipulated to the advantage of a few commanders. A few key 
developments in the late Republic were crucial: first, Gaius Gracchus passed legis-
lation requiring that provinces be determined before consular elections were even 
held, resulting in permanent provinces with active wars being assigned to consuls 
and thereby hardening the hierarchy of command between consuls and praetors 
(298–301). Second, Marius had a political ally bring the matter of the provincial 
assignment of Africa during the Jugurthine War to the tribal assembly, which trans-
ferred this command to him. This legislative innovation set the stage for the supreme 
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commands of Pompey first against the pirates (Lex Gabinia of 67 BCE) and later 
against Mithridates (Lex Manilia of 66 BCE), and of Caesar in Gaul (Lex Vatinia 
of 59 BCE). Drogula insists that Pompey’s apparent superiority over other com-
manders as a result of the Lex Gabinia was due not to the conferral of imperium mai-
us but rather of the manipulation of the notion of provincia, whereby he was allowed 
to enter and take action in the provinciae of other commanders (322).
Augustus, as is well known, based much of his power and authority as Prin-
ceps on his division and administration of the provinces, controlling those with 
active wars ongoing and legions present (imperial provinces) through legates (using 
Pompey’s command in Spain as an authoritative Republican precedent), and dele-
gating to the senate the public provinces that contained defensive garrisons (chapter 
7). As Drogula declares, the senatorial aristocracy should have been appalled at an 
arrangement that so severely curtailed its members’ pursuit of military renown. But 
we should recall that the legati Augusti who commanded legions in the imperial 
provinces were also members of the same senatorial aristocracy, and, although the 
triumph was now closed off to them, they could still receive triumphal decorations 
(ornamenta triumphalia) as rewards for their military success. Drogula also points 
out that Augustus’ legates were of praetorian status (pro praetore) while the gover-
nors of the public provinces ruled as proconsuls, thus enjoying a higher magiste-
rial rank. Indeed, two public provinces, Asia and Africa, though peaceful, became 
crowning achievements of a senator’s career.
One last note on imperium maius: Drogula argues that this concept was first 
broached, but never conferred, in 57 BCE by C. Messius in connection with Pompey’s 
supervision of the grain supply (327). Cicero later proposed this unusual power for C. 
Cassius in 43 BCE (Phil. 11.30) so that he would have supreme command in the war 
against the supporters of Caesar. Thus Cassius could avoid Pompey’s predicament 
in the civil war against Caesar in 49 BCE when he could not command but could 
only cajole his fellow aristocrats to do his bidding, while his rival enjoyed undisputed 
command of a well functioning war machine (329). Augustus took advantage of this 
republican precedent, proposed by no less an authority than Cicero, in his second 
settlement (23 BCE) so that he “could legitimize his intentions to influence affairs 
in provinces not given to him by the state” (362–63).
Overall, this is a very impressive book, for it weighs in on controversial issues 
that are fundamental to our understanding of how the Roman Republic worked. 
Drogula’s argument, while at times repetitive (a result, I think, of analyzing issues so 
closely intertwined that it is impossible to completely unravel them), is in the end 
remarkably consistent, lucid, and persuasive. This book should be essential reading 
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for anyone interested in how Romans conceived of magisterial power and authority 
and ultimately how this conception informed the governing of their city and the 
administration of their empire.
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